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The paper traces the structure of the Euromaidan protests of the late 
2013 and early 2014 in Kyiv, Ukraine. The author attempts to compare the 
phenomenon of Euromaidan to other mass protest actions or the revolu-
tions in the network society of the modern world as described by the Spanish 
sociologist Manuel Castells. The analysis of sociological data concerning 
Euromaidan and the Ukrainian society in general allow to treat Ukraine’s 
‘Revolution of Dignity’ as a ‘rhizomatic’, or a ‘digital’ revolution.
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ЄВрОмАйдАН У КОНтеКСтІ ПрАцІ мАНУелЯ 
КАСтельСА «мереЖІ ОбУреННЯ й НАдІї:  
СУСПІльНІ рУхИ В еПОхУ ІНтерНетУ»
У статті аналізується структура Євромайдану кінця 2013 – по-
чатку 2014 рр. у Києві. Порівнюється феномен Євромайдану з іншими 
акціями масового протесту чи революціями у мережевому суспільстві 
сучасного світу, які описує іспанський соціолог Мануель Кастельс. 
Аналіз соціологічних даних, присвячених Євромайдану та українсько-
му суспільству загалом, дозволяє сприймати Революцію гідності та 
Євромайдан як приклад «ризомної» чи «цифрової» революції. 
Ключові слова: Євромайдан, Революція гідності, мережеве сус-
пільство, ризомна революція, цифрова революція. 
екатэрынчук А. 
еВрОмАйдАН В КОНтеКСте КНИгИ мАНУэлЯ 
КАСтельСА «СетИ ВОЗмУщеНИЯ И НАдеЖды: 
ОбщеСтВеННые дВИЖеНИЯ В эПОхУ ИНтерНетА»
В данной статье анализируется структура Евромайдана конца 
2013 – начала 2014 гг. в Киеве. Сравнивается феномен Евромайдана 
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с другими акциями массового протеста или революциями в сетевом 
обществе современного мира, описанными испанским социологом 
Мануэлем Кастельсом. Анализ социологических данных, посвященных 
Евромайдану и украинскому обществу в целом, позволяет расцени-
вать Революцию достоинства как пример «ризомной» или «цифро-
вой» революции.
Ключевые слова: Евромайдан, Революция достоинства, сетевое 
общество, ризомная революция, цифровая революция. 
On November 21, 2013, civil protests broke out in Kyiv. As it ap­
peared later on, they finally resulted in President Viktor Yanukovych’s 
flight from Ukraine, his removal from power, as well as Russian Fed­
eration’s occupation of Ukrainian territory and the undeclared Russian­
Ukrainian war that, within a year, took the lives of some thousands of 
Ukrainians, both soldiers and civilians. One of the immediate causes 
that brought Ukrainians into the streets of Kyiv was a Facebook post 
by the Ukrainian journalist and blogger Mustafa Nayyem who, on No­
vember 21, called on people to protest against the Ukrainian authori­
ties’ decision not to sign the Association Agreement with the EU [22]. 
Protests spread across the country and involved millions of citizens who 
were dissatisfied with the country’s situation, unconditionally demand­
ed changes, democratization and bringing Ukraine closer to the EU, as 
well as called on to fight with the ever-present corruption and demanded 
to raise the standard of living.
The wave of protests was a surprise not only for the Ukrainian au­
thorities, but also for the political opposition, most of the scholars deal­
ing with social processes, as well as Ukraine’s powerful neighbour Rus­
sia and its president Vladimir Putin. The present paper aims to describe 
the Kyivan Euromaidan of the late 2013/early 2014 from the point of 
view of social science. I will try to outline the socio­demographic, pro­
fessional and cultural structure of the Euromaidan movement, to present 
its causes, motivations and demands of its participants, as well as to 
show its evolution. 
Since November 2013, many commentaries and interpretations con­
cerning those events in Ukraine have been published both in Ukraine 
and abroad. Many of them, however, were primarily of a journalistic 
nature. They often contained contradictory and conflicting arguments. 
For example, while some authors treated the outburst of social unrest 
in Kyiv and the whole Ukraine as a spontaneous phenomenon, others 
claimed that those events were initiated by the Ukrainian political op­
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position and inspired by the West, which was to call in question the 
protests’ spontaneity and imply that this was a coup triggered by the 
West, an illegal removal of the legally elected president Yanukovych 
from power. 
As Fabio Belafatti claims, the Moscow­centric perspective of some 
Western commentators who suggest that the Ukrainian society is in­
capable of a spontaneous uprising for freedom and dignity when not 
inspired by any ‘centre’ steering the whole process, is a manifestation 
of the so­called ‘new orientalism’. In his opinion, it is thinking in im­
perial terms that results in negating the subjectivity of most of Eastern 
European nations beside Russia presented as ‘the only noble nation of 
eastern europe’ [18]. Belafatti’s considerations are based on Edward 
W. Said’s concept of Orientalism [24].
Some doubts also arose as to whether the Euromaidan movement 
represented the whole Ukraine or it was rather an expression of dissat­
isfaction on the part of the radical or even extremist groups represent­
ing a minority of the society and mainly the western part of Ukraine. 
The phenomenon of the 2013/14 Euromaidan a.k.a Maidan inevitably 
raises questions about similarities and differences with other massive 
expressions of civil disobedience over the last years. Some commenta­
tors treat the Euromaidan movement as a specifically Ukrainian, unique 
phenomenon rooted in the tradition of the Zaporozhian Sich [1]. Indeed, 
the events of the late 2013 and the early 2014, in the first place, bring to 
mind the 2004 Orange Revolution in Ukraine that also began at the In­
dependence Square in Kyiv. Some scholars, however, have more than a 
local perspective. In my attempt to describe the Euromaidan movement 
and mass protests in Kyiv and all over Ukraine, I refer to the approach 
of Manuel Castells, who focuses his attention on social movements in 
the framework of the networking of social life. To describe them, this 
renowned sociologist uses such notions as rhizomatic revolution and 
digital revolution [19]. 
The difficulty of describing the problem formulated in this way lies 
in the fact that the process in question is relatively recent and has not 
yet finished. One can still observe its development and results. The dif­
ficulties in describing the Euromaidan revolt and its evolution are point­
ed out by the leading Ukrainian sociologist Volodymyr Paniotto [9, p. 
21–23]. A relatively small number of strictly scholarly papers dealing 
with this issue have been published so far. Given a rather limited num­
ber of scholarly resources on this topis, I will refer to commentaries and 
opinions on the civil unrest in Kyiv and the whole Ukraine expressed by 
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leading representatives of social sciences in Ukraine, mainly sociolo­
gists.
The empirical basis for the description of the Euromaidan protests is 
provided by the three surveys conducted among the protesters in Kyiv. 
The surveys were conducted jointly by the Ilko Kucheriv Democratic 
Initiatives Foundation (DIF) and the Kyiv International Institute of So­
ciology (KIIS) on December 7 and 8, 2013 (a total of 1037 Euromaidan 
participants selected as a random sample were polled), December 20, 
2013 (a total number of respondents was 515, sampling represented all 
permanent locations of Maidan Nezalezhnosti), and February 3, 2014 (a 
total of 502 persons were polled at every stationary location at Maidan). 
The repeated nature of the survey allows to observe how the Euromaid­
an movement was developing and how it responded to the actions taken 
by the Ukrainian authorities, including the use of force.
The Kyivan Maidan was changing under the influence of external 
factors, of which the reactions of President Viktor Yanukovych and 
Prime Minister Mykola Azarov were the most important. It evolved 
under the influence of the growing repressiveness of the government 
and the security agencies. Sociologists who surveyed Euromaidan par­
ticipants in Kyiv distinguished three stages of the protest movement. 
The first stage called Maidan the Rally lasted to mid­December 2013 
and included protests caused by the non­signing of the EU Association 
Agreement in Vilnius and the brutal beating of defenseless students on 
the night of 29 to 30 November 2013. The late December, when protest 
participants settled at the Independence Square, was the period of Maid­
an the Camp. At that time, the government did not yet take large­scale 
brutal measures aiming to disperse the protesters. The third stage was 
Maidan the Sich (being a reference to the tradition of the Zaporozhian 
Sich). Especially in February 2014, Maidan the Sich became the arena 
of regular clashes between protesters, on one side, and riot police and 
internal military forces loyal to President Yanukovych and the govern­
ment, on the other side. Several dozen protesters were killed as live am­
munition was used against protesters.
According to the Ukrainian historian Yaroslav Hrytsak, the 2013/14 
Euromaidan should not be treated as a specifically Ukrainian ‘inven­
tion’, but should be considered within a framework of some broader 
global trends. Prof. Hrytsak points out similarities and differences be­
tween the Euromaidan and the Maidan of 2004. While both revolution­
ary events features the same actors, the main difference between the 
Orange Revolution and the Euromaidan lies in the emergence of a new 
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generation in the Ukrainian society. These ‘peers of independence’ have 
never known life under the Soviet rule and adhere to other values than 
their parents and grandparents. Taking these differences into account, 
one can see the similarities between the Euro Revolution, or Revolution 
of Dignity in Ukraine, on one hand, and the Occupy movement, youth 
protests in Brazil, the Gezi Park protests in Turkey, the Arab Spring or 
the manifestation at the Bolotnaya Square in Moscow [3]. 
The average age of participants of Maidan the Sich was 37. The 
overwhelming majority were young and middle­aged people (people 
aged between 15 and 29 made up 33 percent, and those between 30 
and 54 made up 56 percent of the total number of protest participants). 
Given a more dangerous situation at Maidan the Sich, the percent of 
demonstrators aged between 30 and 54 grew at the expense of younger 
and older people (see Table 1).
Table 1. age of the euromaidan protests participants.
maidan the 
rally
maidan the 
camp
maidan the 
Sich
15 to 29 38 34.1 33.2
30 to 54 49 52.0 56.0
55 and 
older 13 13.09.2015 10.08.2015
Source: Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation (DIF) [24].
Manuel Castells, while describing social movements in the network 
society, analyses the ‘Revolution for liberty and dignity’ in Tunisia, the 
Egyptian Revolution, the Arab uprisings, the Indignados movement in 
Spain, Occupy Wall Street, the so­called ‘Kitchenware Revolution’ in 
Iceland and so on, and tries to find their common features. Trying to 
understand the mechanism of the ‘Revolution for liberty and dignity’, 
he points out: (1) the existence of an active group of unemployment col­
lege graduates, who led the revolt, bypassing any formal leadership; (2) 
the presence of a strong cyberactivism culture and the possibility of the 
open critique of the regime in the long term; (3) a relatively high rate of 
diffusion of Internet use [19, p. 29].
Looking for common features among the mentioned movements in 
Iceland and Tunisia, Castells emphasizes the role of mobile phones and 
social networks on the Internet that played a major role in spreading 
images and messages, the mobilization of society, and fostering public 
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debate. The protests are often triggered by some dramatic event: an eco­
nomic collapse, a self­immolation, a brutal police action etc. [19, p. 45]. 
Movements of this type are usually initiated and led not by radicals, but 
by people of moderate views. For example, in Egypt, the lead was taken 
by representatives of the impoverished middle class with high percent­
age of women, and later they were joined by poor people hit by inflation. 
The demands articulated by protesters included those of increasing the 
standard of living and democratization of the country, both demands be­
ing closely connected with each other [19, p. 95–96].
The events at the Independence Square in Kyiv fit perfectly into this 
scenario of protests. The initial purpose of the Euromaidan protesters 
was to force the government to sign the EU Association Agreement. 
In the absence of reaction on the part of the authorities, the intensity 
of protests decreased and they were expected to quiet down. The situa­
tion changed with the beating of protesting defenceless students by the 
Berkut riot police on the night of 29 to 30 November 2013. This event 
made the initially pro­European and pro­EU demonstrations evolve into 
an unprecedented antigovernment protest.
Surveyors asked respondents about their motivation of joining the 
Maidan protests (see Table 6). The three most important reasons for 
participation in Euromaidan were, in the following sequence: fierce re­
pressions of the authorities against participants of protests, the refusal 
of Viktor Yanukovych to sign the Association Agreement with the EU 
and the wish to change the life in the country. It is noteworthy that in the 
first survey conducted at Maidan, the answer «The wish to change the 
authorities in Ukraine» was only the fourth preference. It is clear there­
fore that the main aim of demonstrators was not so much to change the 
authorities than to change the way of governance. The association with 
the EU was treated, on one hand, as a symbol of democracy and better 
living, and on the other hand, as an instrument which would force politi­
cal elites to change the style of government and respect the fundamental 
rights of citizens. The significance of the desire for change in the coun­
try increased slightly only during the most violent attempts to disperse 
Maidan the Sich. The threat to life and health of the protest participants 
by repressive measures of the authorities only slightly decreased the sig­
nificance of Viktor Yanukovych’s refusal to sign the Association Agree­
ment with the EU as a motivation for their participation in the protests. 
This is shown in Table 2.
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Table 2. what made you come to maidan?
maidan 
the rally
maid-
an the 
camp
maid-
an the 
Sich
The refusal of Viktor Yanukovych to sign 
the Association Agreement with the EU 53.5 40 47.0
Fierce repressions of the authorities 
against protest participants 69.6 69 61.3
Opposition leaders appeals 5.4 6.7 2.8
The wish to change the authorities in 
the country 39.1 38.9 45.6
The wish to change the life in the country 49.9 36.2 51.1
The solidarity with friends, colleagues, 
relatives, who are also at Maidan 6.02.2015 4.1 3.7
Rollback of democracy, the threat of 
dictatorship 18.9 13.7 17.5
It is fun and interesting at Maidan 2.2 1.2 0.4
The wish to take revenge upon the au­
thorities for everything they do in the 
country
5.2 9.6 9.8
The threat that Ukraine will join the 
Customs Union and in general will turn 
towards Russia
16.9 14.4 20.0
Money that I was paid (was promised 
to be paid) 0.3 0.2 0
Other (what exactly) 3.3 8.2 4.6
It is difficult to answer 0.5 0 0
Source: Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation (DIF) [24].
It is symptomatic that appeals of the parliamentary opposition lead­
ers are very rarely mentioned as a reason for joining the protests. It was a 
valid reason only for about three to seven percent of respondents. It con­
firms a lack of trust not only in the ruling camp, but in the political class 
en bloc and in all the institutions associated with the sphere of politics. 
Thus, the survey results cited above undermine the assumption that the 
Euromaidan was the work of the parliamentary opposition aiming mere­
259Серія «Культурологія». Випуск 16
ly to seize power in the state while leaving the quality of political life 
unchanged. They also dismantle the argument that people were paid for 
their participation in the Euromaidan protests. Money paid (or promised 
to be paid) was mentioned among the reasons for participation in the 
protests by maximum 0.3 percent of respondents. Thus, this is a figure 
which is very close to statistical error. The leaders of the protest are not 
politicians, but social activists and journalists, which makes the events 
at Kyiv’s Independence Square similar to the revolutions described by 
Castells (e.g. those in Egypt and Tunisia).
The apolitical nature of the Maidan movement, especially on its earli­
er stage, is pointed out by Wojciech Konończuk i Tadeusz A. Olszański, 
the authors of the study published by the Warsaw­based Centre for East­
ern Studies (OSW). Initially, the protests were of an anti­party character 
with only Ukrainian national flags and the EU flags being seen at rallies 
[21]. It may be considered symbolic that initially two Euromaidans func­
tioned side by side: the first one, located at the Independence Square, 
was a grassroots non­formal initiative of social activists and students, 
while the second one was organized by the leaders of the parliamentary 
opposition at the European Square some several hundred metres away. 
The two Euromaidans merged into one, or rather that of the opposition 
joined that of activists and students on November 26, 2013 [15].
Since then, three leaders of the parliamentary opposition, Arseniy 
Yatsenyuk, Vitali Klitschko and Oleh Tyahnybok became the official 
voice of Maidan, but never got full support and trust of the protests 
participants. As the authors of the mentioned OSW report claim, there 
was lack of one powerful leader of the 2013/14 Maidan protests who 
would be recognized as an authority, as it was during the 2004 Orange 
Revolution. This had to result in problems in communicating and articu­
lating expectancies. Konończuk and Olszański rightly observe that there 
are no reliable sources which might demonstrate the political views of 
demonstrators.
The authors also point out the deep roots of Maidan in Ukrainian 
national and patriotic symbolics, emphasizing the fact that the red­and­
black banner of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army gained the status of an 
all­national symbol, deprived of any radical and xenophobic content, 
unlikely to fall on fertile ground at Maidan [21]. This observation is 
particularly relevant in the context of the large­scale propaganda cam­
paign led first by the Party of Regions and then by the Kremlin aim­
ing to convince public opinion in Ukraine, Russia, and the West that 
Maidan was the work of extremists, fascists and radicals emblematized 
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by the Right Sector [11; 16]. Following the initiative of the historian 
Andreas Umland, a group of leading intellectuals, scholars and experts 
who had been working on Ukrainian issues for years, both from Ukraine 
and abroad, signed a collective statement «Kyiv’s Euromaidan Is A Lib­
erationist And Not Extremist Mass Action Of Civic Disobedience» pub­
lished in the Kyiv­based Den newspaper. The text was an expression of 
disagreement with the groundless accusations of extremism and fascism 
leveled against Euromaidan in order to discredit the protest movement 
[23]. Historical myths and a Moscow­centered perspective presenting 
a barrier to western observers who tried to understand the essence of 
the Ukrainian reality were aptly described by, among others, Timothy 
Snyder [13].
The apolitical nature of the Maidan protests is confirmed by sur­
vey results. Table 3 shows that the overwhelming majority of protesters 
were people who came to Kyiv on their own, not being organized by any 
political party or civil movement. Such people constituted 92 percent of 
participants at Maidan the Rally, 76 percent at Maidan the Camp and 
83.5 percent at Maidan the Sich. Thus, the answers shown in Table 3 
confirm the earlier conclusions about Maidan as a definitely spontane­
ous and grassroots initiative.
Table 3. If you are visiting, was your journey organized or you 
traveled on your own? (poll results).
maidan 
the 
rally
maid-
an the 
camp
maidan 
the Sich
Organized – by one of the parties 1,8 11,9 3,0
Organized – by one of public organi­
zations (or movements) 6,3 11,9 13,3
I came on my own 91,9 76,1 83,5
Source: Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation (DIF) [24].
Castells, while referring to the example of the 2011 Egyptian Revolu­
tion, recognizes the importance of the live streaming technology which 
enables live coverage of events and following them, and frees social 
actors from the authorities’ monopoly in information policy. Besides, 
in every case, an impulse that appears in the virtual space presumes 
– sooner or later – a takeover of the physical space, such as squares 
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and places of symbolic significance for a particular community. As a 
result, community solidarity is transferred from the cyber space to the 
real world [19, p. 57–59]. In this context, the Internet stands as a safe 
space where networks of outrage and hope connect and, extending their 
reach to the physical space, get into interaction with the society. This 
mechanism makes it possible to provide an alternative to the networks 
of power [19, p. 81]. 
The presence of new movements on the Internet results in an un­
precedented intensity of artistic activities and political creativity (satiri­
cal videos, Internet memes and vlogs were created which played both 
soothing and mobilizing roles). This form of activity was especially 
helpful in addressing and mobilizing the youth population [19, p. 107]. 
Another common feature of the discussed movements is their horizontal 
multicentred structure. They lack one leader, which is treated by some 
critics as their weakness, while others emphasize the regime’s difficulty 
in suppressing them in view of the lack of a single decision­making 
centre. Castell calls these new social movements with similar character­
istics in the networked world ‘digital revolutions’ [19, p. 103–107] or 
‘rhizomatic revolutions’ [19, p. 140–145].
The above outlined internal structure of the Euromaidan movement 
reported by sociological surveys allows to analyze it as a form of global 
tendencies described by Castells and not as a local phenomenon un­
found elsewhere in the world. Yaroslav Hrytsak refers to the World Val­
ues Survey [26] demonstrating that in the Ukrainian society, the centre 
of gravity is being transferred from survival­directed values typical of 
closed societies to self­expression values typical of open societies. At 
the same time, a reverse process takes place in Russia where the focus 
is shifted to the values associated with a closed society. Ukraine’s shift­
ing towards western values became possible due to a steady economic 
growth up to 2008 that raised and strengthened the middle class. But the 
economic growth alone is not a sufficient factor. Within the same pe­
riod, the middle class emerged in Russia as well. To make the evolution 
from the closed society’s values to those of the open society possible, 
economic growth should be accompanied by democracy [3].
In his video interview published on YouTube on November 25, 2013, 
Hrytsak stresses that Euromaidan is the work of the young generation 
with college degrees but without future. Its representatives have no op­
portunity to make a career when not turning to corruption and nepotism. 
In Hrytsak’s opinion, Euromaidan is a rebellion of young mobile people 
who are active users of social network services and who have reasons 
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and ambitions to live like middle­class people, but in Ukraine they are 
more and more like the proletariat. These people are aiming at changing 
not politicians but the state, and this is where their scepticism towards the 
hitherto political elites stems from [4]. The oligarchy system in Ukraine 
was a barrier for the generation of the young and the active travelling 
abroad and speaking foreign languages. This system effectively fought 
against bottom­up entrepreneurship, while the mechanisms of corrup­
tion reached the most advanced level among political and business elites 
which, after all, can hardly be separated from each other.
In Ukraine, like in other countries examined by Castells, a huge 
role was played by independent media epitomized by the Hromadske.
tv internet television channel. The Euromaidan events, including the 
attempts to brutally and violently disperse the protesters, were live 
streamed to audiences oll over the world and commented on an ongo­
ing basis in the cyber space, at the so­called virtual Euromaidans, e.g. 
on Facebook. This allowed for mobilization of Ukrainians in Ukraine 
and abroad, encompassing recents migrants from Ukraine as well as 
Ukrainian national minority communities on different continents. Both 
groups became genuine ambassadors of Ukraine’s democratic and pro­
European aspirations in the world.
As Castells observes, digital revolutions were born in societies with 
a high level of access to the Internet. Tunisia and Egypt that are at the 
top of Internet access rankings in Africa may serve as examples. In this 
regard, Ukraine occupies one of the last places in Europe, although its 
indicators in absolute values are comparable to those in Tunisia, Egypt 
and Turkey. According to data provided by GfK Ukraine, in 2013, 50 
percent of Ukrainian citizens were Internet users, and their number in­
creased by as many as six percent since 2012 [2; 20]. The June 2013 
report of the Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation shows 
that the Internet became the major source of political information for 
more than 21 percent of Ukrainians [12]. 
Euromaidan is similar to rhizomatic revolutions in terms of socio­
professional structure and level of education of the protests participants. 
According to official governmental statistics, one in fifteen Ukrainian 
citizens was registered as a private entrepreneur [5]. At Maidan, private 
enterpreneurs (businessmen) constituted about 10 to 17 percent at the 
time of clashes with the police, which would mean their overrepresenta­
tion among the protest participants.
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Table 4. education of the euromaidan protests participants.
maidan 
the rally
maidan 
the camp
maidan 
the Sich
Incomplete secondary school 0.8 2.2 4.3
Secondary and vocational 
school 22.1 38.9 43.1
Incomplete higher education 
(student) 14.4 10.3 9.5
Higher education 62.7 48.7 43.1
Source: Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation (DIF) [24].
Table 5. occupation of the euromaidan protests participants.
maidan 
the 
rally
maidan 
the 
camp
maid-
an the 
Sich
Manager (deputy manager) of the en­
terprise, institution, department 8.0 4.2 4.5
Specialist (with higher or vocational 
education) 39.5 21.7 26.7
Worker of law enforcement agencies, 
military man 1.4 2.7 3.0
Entrepreneur (businessman) 9.3 12.3 17.4
Clerk of servitorial staff (without spe­
cial education) 2.4 2 4.2
Worker 6.7 14.4 15.2
Agricultural worker, farmer 0.6 1.9 2.9
Pupil 0.4 1.1 –
Student 13.2 10.1 6.2
Non­working pensioner 9.4 11.2 7.4
Housewife 1.5 0.1 0.3
I do not have permanent employment, 
but have several odd jobs 3.1 8.5 4.5
I am temporarily unemployed and do 
not have any sources of income 2.4 7.7 8.5
Other 2.3 2.1 0.2
Source: Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation (DIF) [24].
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 On the one hand, it may appear surprising, since this very profes­
sional category has much to lose. But on the other hand, it is business­
men who, along with students (or, more broadly, the youngest genera­
tion born already in the independent Ukraine), are most interested in an 
effective eradication of corruption that kills entrepreneurship and blocks 
the development of the middle class in Ukraine. Most of the protests 
participants had a higher education. In fact, Euromaidan was a repre­
sentation of the whole Ukrainian society. On the one hand, we can see 
that the protests were driven by young people and those who aspired to 
the middle class, businessmen and qualified professionals clamouring 
for democracy and fight against corruption. On the other hand, manu­
al workers and the unemployed who took to the streets were probably 
more concerned with welfare issues, but at the same time understood 
the importance of a joint action against the oppressive brutal authorities.
Maidan was not a homogeneous phenomenon in terms of language 
used by its participants. The protesters included both Ukrainophones 
and Russophones (see Table 6). Almost half of the demonstrators at 
Maidan, during all three stages of the protests, were people who spoke 
Russian at home or were bilingual, speaking Russian and Ukrainian in 
equal measure. It can be seen that the percentage of Ukrainian­speaking 
participants of the protests grew when the Independence Square became 
a less safe place (Maidan the Sich).
Table 6. what language do you mainly speak at home?
maidan 
the rally
maidan 
the camp
maidan 
the Sich
Russian 25.9 19.6 15.6
Ukrainian 54.6 52.5 59.0
Both Russian and Ukrainian 18.6 27.6 24.0
Other 0.4 0.3 0.8
It is difficult to answer 0.5 0 0.5
Source: Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation (DIF) [24].
This is particularly relevant when we try to consider Euromaidan 
in terms of digital revolutions. Castells, while analysing revolutions in 
Tunisia and Iceland, emphasizes the fact that these states’ societies are 
ethnically and culturally homogeneous, and heterogeneity of a society 
can significantly increase the chances of a revolution for success, pro­
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viding support of different social groups that adhere to different values 
[19, p. 57]. The lack of linguistic unity among the citizens of Ukraine 
did not split the society, although linguistic and ethnic heterogeneity 
was especially politicized by the pro­Yanukovych party, as well as by 
pro­Moscow elements and the Kremlin propaganda machine. Sociolog­
ical studies, therefore, debunk yet another myth. The discussed survey 
results show that the mentioned propaganda activities at the macro level 
did not produce the expected results.
The analysis of the empirical data concerning Euromaidan and treat­
ing the 2013/14 Ukrainian protests in terms of a rhizomatic revolution 
allows for drawing conclusions that are more than local in scope. The 
protests that started in Kyiv and spread all over Ukraine within a short 
period of time aroused immense interest in Russia. Russian sociolo­
gists compared the protests in Kyiv to those they had observed earlier 
in Moscow and Saint Petersburg. They arrived at the conclusion that a 
sociological portrait of the protesters in Saint Petersburg after the 2011 
elections is very similar to that of Kyiv’s Maidan of 2013: 66 percent of 
them were people with higher education, 57 percent were males. There 
was a minor difference in age between the participants of the two pro­
tests. In Saint Petersburg, the average age of the demonstrators was low­
er than in Kyiv, with as many as 50 percent of them being younger than 
30. Middle­aged and older people appeared to be less active. Another 
difference concerned the level of institutionalization of the protesters. 
In Saint Petersburg, one third of them declared affiliation with political 
parties and civil movements, while in Kyiv only about 10 percent of 
the pollees made similar declarations. Russian sociologists also point 
out the differences between the protests held in Moscow and Kyiv. The 
Moscow protest after the 2011 elections was participated mainly by 
residents of the capital city and its outskirts, while residents of Kyiv 
comprised only about 50 percent of the total number of participants of 
Maidan the Rally [6]. This may serve as evidence of stronger economic 
barriers and mental differences between residents of Moscow and Saint 
Petersburg, on one hand, and the rest of Russia, on the other. Unlike in 
Ukraine, protests held in the largest and wealthiest cities of Russia do 
not win mass support in other regions.
On the other side, the Internet access rate in Russia is significantly 
higher than that in Ukraine (in 2014, it reached 66 percent) [10], which 
might be a favourable factor in launching mass protests such as those in 
Ukraine. One can go so far as to draw a bold parallel between the case of 
Tunisia and Egypt, which, according to Castells, being the most demo­
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cratic states in the region infected the culturally similar countries with the 
virus of a digital revolution and thus caused the Arab Spring, and that of 
Euromaidan, which may be contagious to the vast, multiethnic, authori­
tarian and corrupted Russian Federation. It seems that Vladimir Putin, 
who repeatedly turned to the idea of imposing restrictions on the Inter­
net and increasing the state’s control over social network websites, aptly 
identified the source of threat for the current status quo in Russia [7].
The characteristics of the Euromaidan movement based on sociolog­
ical surveys and its comparison to digital rhizomatic revolutions in the 
networked society described by Castells allow to consider Euromaidan 
as a representation of the whole Ukrainian society. They both reveal its 
heterogeneity and show features that are common to Euromaidan and 
other discussed revolutionary events.
The cited survey results show Euromaidan as a grassroots protest 
guided by values and not by a leader (unlike it was during the 2004 
Orange Revolution). Euromaidan thus appears to fit into mechanisms 
described by Castells as ‘networks of outrage and hope’. What is impor­
tant is its decentralized horizontal structure epitomized by a bottom­up, 
Internet­based dimension of this form of civil protest. The process is 
driven by young, active, mobile, entrepreneurial and moderate people 
who aspire to the middle class. Its distinctive feature is the lack of one 
decision­making centre and one leader, which may result in organiza­
tional chaos, but, on the other hand, raises difficulties for regimes that 
suppress protests. As one leader is eliminated, there immediately ap­
pear next ones in different places. On that account there is hope that 
democratization of the Ukrainian society is a consistent trend that would 
be difficult to reverse even by military means. One can formulate even 
more advanced conclusions here. If the war of Russia against Ukraine 
is treated as a manifestation of the Kremlin’s fear to catch the virus of 
revolution from Russia’s close neighbour, we may soon expect some 
serious perturbations in the Russian society and/or those of other post­
Soviet states. Their scope and intensity will surely depend on whether 
and, if yes, when key reforms are implemented in Ukraine that result in 
improving the standard of living of its citizens. 
Translated from Polish by Andrij Saweneć
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